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Wahl: Protecting the Wolf in Sheep's Clothing

PROTECTING THE WOLF IN SHEEP ’S CLOTHING:
PERVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MC KENNON RULE
by
Jenny B. Wahl*

Suppose an employer accused of discrimination learns during litigation that the
plaintiff had fabricated a college degree, hidden a prior criminal conviction, or stolen
confidential documents. Will evidence of the concealed misconduct shield the employer
from liability? Not under McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.1 In this
landmark case, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that such plaintiffs might obtain
relief even if the “after-acquired” evidence would have led to lawful termination or
lawful failure to hire if defendants had uncovered it when it occurred.
Most commentators applaud McKennon, complaining only that it does not go far
enough in combating employer discrimination. Left unacknowledged, however, are the
potentially perverse consequences of the ruling. McKennon dilutes the effectiveness of
labor-market signaling because it protects the wolf in sheep’s clothing as well as the
sheep. The unintended result of this well-intentioned rule may be reduced productivity,
poorer matches of workers to jobs, higher turnover, and increased costs of hiring and
assessment. By rendering signals less reliable, McKennon complicates the employer’s
task of distinguishing the sheep from the wolves. Consequently, the ruling may
increase the incidence of statistical discrimination, particularly in the form of pre-hire
screening. At the same time, McKennon erodes the benefits of acquiring human capital
and marketable skills to people with statutorily protected traits. In sum, despite its
praiseworthy objectives, McKennon may well worsen labor-market conditions for
minorities and others covered by discrimination laws.
What follows is, first, a description of the typical scenarios that arise in
after-acquired-evidence cases and the law surrounding McKennon. Section II
discusses how the economic literature on information and signaling applies to such
cases; section III elaborates upon the motives behind and the perversities of McKennon;
and section IV offers conclusions.

*

Associate Professor of Economics, Carleton College, Northfield, MN. A.B., summa cum
laude, Indiana University; M.A., University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Chicago. The
author thanks Ned Wahl, Mike Hemesath, and Mark Ramseyer for their comments.
1
513 U.S. 352 (1995). The Court had granted a writ of certiorari in a related Sixth Circuit
case, which was settled before the decision. See Milligan-Jensen v. Mich. Tech. Univ., 975
F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 509 U.S. 943 (1993), cert. dismissed, 509 U.S. 943 (1993).
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Anatomy of an After-Acquired-Evidence Lawsuit: Case Law
Leading up to McKennon

In the typical after-acquired-evidence case, the plaintiff complains of discriminatory
treatment by a former, current, or prospective employer.2 The employer offers an
initial defense, claiming to have fired, disciplined, or rebuffed the plaintiff for legitimate
reasons. During discovery, however, the employer finds evidence of job misconduct or
résumé fraud that would have resulted in dismissal or refusal to hire had the defendant
known earlier of the bad acts. Résumé fraud typically consists of misrepresentation of
educational or work experience qualifications, concealment of misconduct in a previous
job, or failure to report previous criminal convictions.3
2

Most federal claims have been brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. and Supp. V), or the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 and Supp. V).
Future federal claims will likely also involve the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiffs
have also filed assorted state claims -- for example, under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil
Rights Act. M ICH. COMP. LAWS A NN. § 37.2201-11 (West 1999).
3

According to various sources, résumé fraud seems rampant in the U.S. Thorndike
Deland Associates conducted a survey of human resource managers in 1992. See False
Credentials, HRM AGAZINE, July 1992, at 20, 22. These managers observed that falsifying
credentials was commonplace, particularly in the areas of job performance, compensation
history, and personality traits. Id. at 20, 22. Vericon Resources reported that 80 percent of job
applications contain lies of some sort, particularly about education. Sherryl D. Wade,
Vericon Plays ‘To Tell the Truth’ with Résumés, A TLANTA BUS . CHRON., Dec 16, 1991, at 26A.
One international recruiter found “that more than 30 percent of job seekers lie on their
résumés, not including lies-of-omission.” Robert Half, Managing Your Career, M GMT .
A CCT ., May 1989, at 15. A 1988 study found that almost 1/3 of résumés misstated dates of
employment by 3 months or more. Moreover, “11 [percent] of job applicants lied about why
they had left previous jobs, 4 [percent] fudged job titles, 3 [percent] listed fake emp loyers, 3
[percent] fabricated jobs, and 3 [percent] pretended to have a college degree.” Joan E.
Rigdon, Deceptive Résumés Can Be Door-Openers But Can Become An Employee’s
Undoing, W ALL ST . J., June 17, 1992, at B1; see also Mitchell H. Rubinstein, The Use of
Predischarge Misconduct Discovered After an Employees’ [sic] Termination as a Defense in
Employment Litigation, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.2 (1990) (noting that employers find that
10 percent of job applicants lie, mostly about their criminal records and medical history);
David D. Kadue & William J. Dritsas, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employee
Misconduct and Résumé Fraud Cases, 44 LAB . L. J. 531, 532 n.5 (1993) (offering anecdotal
evidence that 10 to 20 percent of plaintiffs make significant misstatements or omissions on
their job applications). Kadue and Dritsas also cited a study which indicates that up to “33
percent of 15- to 30-year-olds are willing to lie on a résumé.” Id. at n.5. (citing Dale R. Crider,
Resume Fraud Complicates Firing Claims, NAT ’L L.J., Dec. 7, 1992, at 17). See also
Rosemary Alito, Résumé Frauds May Forego Right to Sue, N.J. L.J., April 27, 1992, at S6

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/5

2

Wahl: Protecting the Wolf in Sheep's Clothing

1999]

PROTECTING THE WOLF IN SHEEP ’S CLOTHING

1. Cases that Ordered Summary Judgment for the Employer
Before McKennon, many courts agreed that, if after-acquired evidence would have
caused the plaintiff to be fired (or never hired initially), the employer defendant was
entitled to summary judgment. Judges in these cases largely decided that the plaintiff,
by virtue of his or her misrepresentations, simply had no legal standing to pursue a
discrimination claim. The leading case of Summers v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co. came from the Tenth Circuit.4 The Sixth and Eighth Circuits, most district courts,
and many state courts followed Summers. 5
a. Job Misconduct.
In Summers, plaintiff V. Ray Summers, a 56-year-old Mormon, claimed he was fired
from his job as an insurance field-claims representative because of his age and religious
affiliation. State Farm, on the other hand, cited Summers’s unsatisfactory job
performance, poor attitude, and inability to get along with fellow employees and
customers as reasons for the discharge. Although the company knew of nine instances
in which Summers had doctored records, forged a signature, or possibly submitted fake
receipts, State Farm conceded that it had not fired the plaintiff for these acts. For these
offenses, the company had put Summers on probation for two weeks without pay and
warned him to stop his improper conduct. After Summers brought suit, his former
employer found that Summers had actually falsified more than 150 records, 18 of them
after the probationary period. Summers did not deny doing so. The court of appeals
affirmed the district court’s granting of State Farm’s motion for summary judgment in

(citing another study that claims that 75 percent of employee applications contain false
information). In a bizarre recent incident, the owners of a shell company established in St.
Paul revealed that they were not sure of anything on their CEO’s résumé, including his name.
Mike Hughlett, Tangled Tale of Equisure Strewn with Allegations, ST . PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
Sept. 4, 1997, at 1E.
4
864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
5
For more detailed discussions of state court verdicts, see Claudia D. Orr, The Defense of
Résumé Fraud and Other “After-Acquired Evidence” of Misconduct under Sixth Circuit and
Michigan Case Law, 70 U. DET . M ERCY L. REV. 657 (1993); Alito, supra note 3, at 1342. For
useful studies of federal cases, see Kadue & Dritsas, supra note 3; Kenneth G. Parker, Note,
After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases: A State of Disarray, 72 TEX.
L. REV. 403 (1993). See also Barbara Ryniker Evans & Robert E. McKnight, Jr., Splitting the
Baby on After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 A M. J. TRIAL
A DVOC . 241 (1995) (providing a good general survey); Robert F. Thompson III, Note,
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.: The Masquerading Doctor, the “Greatest
Treason,” and After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Suits, 49 A RK. L.
REV. 625 (1996).
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this job-misconduct case. 6
b. Résumé Fraud: Job Qualifications.
The Tenth Circuit and district courts within it also granted summary judgment in
cases involving fraudulent reporting of job qualifications. In Bonger v. American Water
Works, for example, Rosie Bonger had worked as a human resources director for a
water company.7 The interviewer who had screened candidates for Bonger’s position
had rejected all applicants who did not have college degrees and a minimum number of
years of experience in the human resources field. Bonger was fired, allegedly for poor
performance. She claimed instead that her discharge was motivated by her sex and
national origin. (Bonger was Hispanic.) While the action was pending, the company
learned that Bonger did not have a college degree and had taken nearly three thousand
pages of confidential personnel files and given them to her attorney just before being
fired. The company successfully established that it would have legitimately terminated
Bonger for résumé fraud or job misconduct, no matter what.
The principal case concerning job qualifications, however, is from the Sixth Circuit:
Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. 8 Mildred Johnson, a black female
6

Another job misconduct suit that resulted in summary judgment for the employer is
O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992). Summers
tried to use two Ninth Circuit cases to support his position. In Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d
1416 (9th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff was denied employment as a letter sorter. The Postal Service
prevailed in the district court. The plaintiff appealed, saying that the district court should
have admitted evidence that the Postal Service did not know of the plaintiff’s epilepsy at the
time it rejected her for a job, but discovered her handicap afterward. The plaintiff’s strategy
backfired: the appellate court determined that this evidence would not have been admissible
to enlarge the defendant’s basis of rejection, but was admissible to rebut the applicant’s claim
that she was physically qualified for the job. In Nanty v. Barrow Co., 660 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir.
1981), the plaintiff (an American Indian) was rejected for a job as a truck driver. Three days
later, two Caucasians were hired on the basis of superior qualifications. The district court
found that the plaintiff was not qualified and gave judgment to the defendant. The appellate
court reversed, however, saying that superior qualifications are not relevant in determining
whether discrimination existed. Yet such evidence, according to the court, is relevant to the
question of whether Nanty would have been hired absent discrimination. This court
essentially advocated an additional determination of whether the plaintiff had a right to the
job or monetary relief. Despite Summers’s pleas, the Tenth Circuit court decided that the
cases instead buttressed the defendant’s arguments.
7
789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992).
8
955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992). For other cases that advocated summary judgment on the
basis of misrepresented job qualifications, see Murnane v. American Airlines, Inc., 667 F.2d 98
(D.C. Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); O’Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 656
(D. Utah 1990), aff’d, 12 F.3d 176 (10th. Cir. 1994), vacated, 513 U.S. 1141 (1995); Grzenia v.
Interspec, Inc., No. 91-C290, 1991 WL 222105 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21 1991); Agbor v. Mountain Fuel
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employed as a field-relations manager, initially brought suit in state court alleging
breach-of-contract violation of Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. The case
was later removed to federal district court. Honeywell maintained that the company had
fired Johnson for refusing to improve her availability, flexibility, knowledge, and
willingness to follow directions. During the discovery period, Honeywell found that
Johnson had falsely claimed on her job application that she had a college degree and
significant work experience. (Johnson had replied to a newspaper advertisement that
specified these attributes as necessary qualifications for the position.) Honeywell stated
that it would not have scheduled Johnson for an interview, much less hired her, if the
company had known of the fabrications. The appellate court agreed, further
concluding that Honeywell had adequate and just cause to dismiss Johnson.
Consequently, it decided that Johnson was not entitled to relief, affirming the district
court’s directed verdict for Honeywell on the Elliott-Larsen claim and reversing the
denial of Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment on a wrongful discharge claim.
c. Résumé Fraud: Misconduct in Previous Jobs.
The Sixth Circuit also granted employers summary judgment in cases where
plaintiffs had failed to reveal pertinent information about misconduct in previous jobs.
In Dotson v. U.S. Postal Service, for example, the plaintiff was terminated as a
part-time letter carrier due to a physical condition that limited his ability to carry mail. 9
After Dotson initiated an action claiming disability discrimination, the defendant
discovered that Dotson had omitted prior health and employment information on his job
application - including the fact that he was dismissed from previous jobs at a state
prison and an A&P warehouse. The defendant successfully established that Dotson’s
untruthfulness would have precluded his being hired initially.
d. Résumé Fraud: Prior Criminal Convictions.
Supply Co., 810 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Utah 1993); Rich v. Westland Printers, 62 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 379 (D. Md. 1993); Bray v. Forest Pharm., Inc., 812 F. Supp. 115 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
See also Carroll v. City of Chicago, No. 87-C8995, 1990 WL 37631 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 1990);
Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
9

977 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 892 (1992). For other cases that
advocated summary judgment for employers when plaintiffs had failed to reveal misconduct
in previous jobs, see Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); Freeman v. Kansas State Network, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 995 (D. Kan.
1989); Carroll v. Chicago, 1990 WL 37631 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Churchman v. Pinkerton’s Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515 (D.
Kan. 1991); Kravit v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1992);
George v. Meyers, No. CIV. A.91-2308-O, 1992 WL 97788 (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 1992); Greene v.
Standard Register Co., 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1151 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Rich v.
Westland Printers, 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 379 (D. Md. 1993); Welch v. Liberty Mach.
Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403 (8th Cir. 1994).
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Sixth-Circuit defendants received summary judgment as well when plaintiffs had
neglected to report previous criminal convictions. In Milligan-Jensen v. Mich. Tech.
Univ., for instance, the plaintiff indicated on her job application for the position of
Public Safety Officer that she had never been convicted of an offense more serious
than a minor traffic violation.10 She also signed a statement acknowledging that
misrepresentation of facts was grounds for dismissal regardless of when discovered by
her employer. After the plaintiff sued for age and sex discrimination, the defendant
found that she had in fact omitted a prior conviction for driving under the influence of
alcohol. The appellate court reversed the district court’s judgment for her and ordered
the district court to enter judgment for her former employer.
Employers received summary judgment in similar cases brought in the courts for the
Eastern District of Michigan and the District of Kansas.11 In the Michigan case, a black
male named Foster Benson worked as a manual laborer for Quanex Corporation for
three months. He resigned, saying he was taking another job. In fact, Benson went to
a drug rehabilitation center. Afterwards, he reapplied to Quanex, which refused to
re-hire him. Benson then complained that he had been racially harassed at work and
that his voluntary resignation amounted to a constructive discharge. During discovery,
Quanex found that Benson had lied about his employment history and misrepresented
his criminal record. Instead of working at General Motors, as he had claimed on his job
application, Benson was at the time incarcerated for robbery. Moreover, Benson had
acknowledged in writing that he understood that falsification of information on the
application would be grounds for discharge. In the Kansas case, the plaintiff sued her
former employer for alleged racial and sexual harassment. During discovery, the
employer found that she had not revealed a felony conviction for fraud committed on a
state agency and three terminations for cause by former employers.
2. Cases that Departed from Summary Judgment for the Employer
Although many pre-McKennon courts embraced a rule of summary judgment for
employers in after-acquired-evidence cases, others emphatically rejected it. Why?
Because it highlighted the undeserving plaintiff rather than the potentially unsavory
defendant. In at least some cases, the defendant arguably had fired (or had not hired)
the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s race, age, gender, or other immutable
characteristic - in other words, doing what discrimination statutes sought to prevent.
Courts opposed to summary judgment therefore focused on remedies.12 The two
10

975 F.2d. 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 509 U.S. 903 (1993), cert. dismissed, 509 U.S.
943 (1993).
11

Benson v. Quanex Corp. Mich. Seamless Tube Div., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 743
(E.D. Mich. 1992); Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp. 991 (D. Kan. 1989).
12
Some courts considered assigning liability to employers but no damages.
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leading cases came from the Eleventh and Third Circuits. The Seventh Circuit also
eventually repudiated a summary-judgment rule.
a. Résumé Fraud: Prior Criminal Convictions.
The Eleventh Circuit made its position clear in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co.13
In this case, a female construction-crew flagperson named Joyce Neil alleged
inadequate compensation, sexual harassment, and retaliatory discharge. In depositions,
the employer learned that Neil had lied on her job application about a prior conviction
for possession of cocaine and marijuana. The court refused to grant summary
judgment to Dunn, strongly disagreeing with the reasoning in Summers. The Wallace
court said that the Summers ruling improperly ignored the lapse of time between
Summers’s discharge and the discovery of the misconduct that would have
legitimatized Summers’s termination. According to the court, Summers also
undermined Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Summers invited employers to avoid
liability by rummaging through an employee’s background for flaws instead of acting to
eliminate discrimination. The court went so far as to envision this implausible scenario:
Summers encourages an employer with a proclivity for unlawful motives to hire a woman -despite knowledge of a legitimate reason that would normally cause the employer not to
employ her -- to destroy any evidence of such knowledge, to pay her less on the basis of her
gender, to sexually harass her until she protests, to discharge her, and to “discover” the
legitimate motive during the ensuing litigation, thus escaping any liability for the unlawful
treatment of the erstwhile employee.14

The majority opinion in Wallace therefore suggested that courts should limit
damages in after-acquired-evidence cases rather than eliminating employer liability. It
determined that reinstatement or front-pay relief was inappropriate in a Summers setting.
The court also conceded that limiting back pay awards and fees made sense if the
employer proved it would have discovered the after-acquired evidence apart from the
lawsuit. Judge Godbold dissented, however, asserting that the court should dismiss the
suit. He argued that the plaintiff would not have been hired if she had not lied on her
application; she therefore had no standing to sue. Judge Godbold also pointed out that
the employer was at risk of suits for harm to the public on the grounds of respondeat
superior or negligent hiring.

Understandably, employers preferred the “no liability” rule promulgated by Summers to a “no
damages” rule, in part because the latter might affect the company’s standing with its
insurance carrier or the EEOC whereas the former would not.
13

14

968 F.2d 1174 (1992), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 62 F.3d 374 (11th Cir. 1995).

968 F.2d at 1180-81.
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The Third Circuit court refused to grant an employer summary judgment in Mardell
v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co.15 Here, the plaintiff claimed she was a victim of age
and sex discrimination. Her employer fired her for allegedly poor job performance.
During discovery, the employer learned that Mardell had lied on her résumé, saying
falsely that she had a college degree and substantial relevant work experience.
Following Summers, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.
But the Third Circuit, like the Eleventh, decided to break ranks with other courts and
held that after-acquired evidence could not be used to determine an employer’s liability
for discrimination. This court explicitly shifted the emphasis from the plaintiff’s
standing to sue under discrimination statutes to the defendant’s allegedly discriminatory
actions. As in Wallace, the Mardell court decided that remedies rather than liability
should be the center of attention. Specifically, it suggested that damages should accrue
until the date of judgment.16
c. Résumé Fraud: Prior Criminal Convictions Redux.
The Seventh Circuit wrestled with the question of summary judgment in
after-acquired-evidence cases. It adopted the rule, with modifications, in the 1992 case
of Washington v. Lake County, Ill. Here, a former jailer named Eddie Washington
alleged that his termination was racially motivated.17 According to his employer,
Washington was fired because of his arrest for criminal sexual assault. (These charges
were later dropped.) At the time of Washington’s discharge, his employer did not
know that the man had falsely reported a clean criminal record on his job application.
15

31 F.3d 1221 (3d Cir. 1994), vacated in part, 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995). For other cases
that did not grant summary judgment in cases of misrepresented qualifications or unreported
misconduct in current or previous jobs, see Boyd v. Rubbermaid Commercial Products, Inc.,
62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1228 (W.D. Va. 1992); Rupley v. Rorer Pharm. Corp., No. 90C5597, 1992 WL 37121 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Ikpoh v. Central DuPage Hosp., No. 90-C7146,1992WL
211074 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 1992); Smith v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 60 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995);
Massey v. Trump’s Castle Hotel & Casino, 838 F. Supp. 314 (D. N.J. 1993); Moodie v. Federal
Reserve Bank, 831 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Cooper v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 64 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 972 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also Smith v. General Scanning Inc., 876 F.2d
1315 (7th Cir. 1989) (in dicta). In the case of Baab v. AMR Service Corp., 811 F. Supp. 1246
(N.D. Ohio 1993), the court concluded that the plaintiff had suffered no legal damage because
her employer proved that it would have discharged her had it known of her falsified medical
and employment history. But this court also determined that the after-acquired-evidence
doctrine established in Summers did not bar the claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
16
This court later had to comply with the McKennon rule, awarding damages only up to
the date of discovery. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072 (3d Cir. 1995).
17
969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992).
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In fact, Washington had pled guilty to criminal trespass in 1974 and was convicted of
third-degree assault in 1981, although he served no jail time. Understandably, his
employer (the Lake County Sheriff’s Department) never would have hired Washington or would have fired him immediately - had it known the truth. The trial court granted
summary judgment to his employer. In order to affirm, the appellate court held the
following: an employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, acting in a
non-discriminatory manner, it would have discharged the employee upon learning of the
misrepresentation. The sheriff’s department could not prove that it always fired lying
employees, in part because it unearthed no evidence of other employees who had lied.
But the court decided that, given the nature of the plaintiff’s crimes, the burden shifted
to Washington to produce affirmative evidence that he would not have been fired if
treated in a race-neutral fashion. Washington could not do so. As a result, the
defendant met the standard set by the court and won summary judgment.
Note, however, the subtlety of the Seventh-Circuit approach. In a case decided the
same year as Washington, the plaintiff had denied any felony convictions on his job
application. In fact, he had earlier been convicted of armed robbery. Although the
employer might have fired the employee upon learning of the conviction, the court
found no proof that it would have done so. Unlike in Washington’s case, the court
refused to bar this plaintiff’s Title VII suit.18
d. Résumé Fraud: Job Qualifications Redux.
The Seventh Circuit solidified its stance in the 1993 case of Kristufek v. Hussmann
FoodService Co.19 Here, plaintiff Arthur Kristufek argued that he had been fired
because of his age and because he had opposed terminating an older secretary.
Kristufek’s employer maintained that the man was let go because of a corporate
reorganization. During discovery, the defendant found that Kristufek had falsely
claimed to have earned a bachelor’s degree and completed graduate coursework. The
district court barred Kristufek from any recovery of damages, entering a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. But the appellate court remanded the case, saying that
Kristufek’s lies did not preclude his recovery for retaliatory discharge. The court
advised, however, that Kristufek’s back pay award and attorneys’ fees should be
reduced to reflect the time at which the company discovered Kristufek’s lies.
B. The McKennon Case
Like the Summers case, McKennon dealt with misconduct discovered after an
18

Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1992) (dismis sed by the court on other
grounds).
19

985 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1993).
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employee was fired. Christine McKennon alleged that she lost her secretarial job
because of her age; she filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). Her employer, The Nashville Banner, contended that it dismissed her as part
of a staff cutback. In conducting discovery, the newspaper’s lawyers found that
McKennon had taken home several confidential documents in violation of company
policy. If the Banner had discovered her action, it would have fired her, as McKennon
herself acknowledged. As in various earlier Sixth-Circuit cases and as in Summers, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit viewed the after-acquired evidence as a complete
bar to relief.20
The Supreme Court saw otherwise. In a unanimous opinion, the court refused to
adopt a “no-relief” rule. Instead, successful plaintiffs in cases like McKennon can
recover back pay from the time of discriminatory discharge to the date after-acquired
evidence comes to light - the remedy proposed in Kristufek. The Court suggested that
reinstatement and front pay typically are inappropriate, provided employers can establish
that after-acquired evidence would in fact have led to termination. But the Court did
leave open the possibility of additional remedies under “extraordinary equitable
circumstances.”21
The Court pointed to the purpose of the ADEA in formulating its opinion. Along
with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the
National Labor Relations Act, the Equal Pay Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
ADEA is intended to wipe out workplace discrimination. The award of back pay,
according to the Court, is one means of restoring people to the position they would
have occupied absent the discrimination.
The McKennon court also addressed the “flyspecking” issue raised in Wallace.
Specifically, it noted that a defendant’s potential liability for a prevailing plaintiff’s
attorneys’ fees, as well as sanctions imposed under Rule 11, should discourage

20

McKennon claimed she took the documents because she feared for her job security.
She argued that her case differed from Summers because her action directly related to the
discrimination she was about to suffer. The appellate court dryly noted that adopting
McKennon’s “nexus” argument would require applying it in cases where the plaintiff stole
money from his employer in anticipation of a wrongful discharge. McKennon v. Nashville
Banner Pub. Co., 9 F.3d 539, 543 n.8 (6th Cir. 1993).
21
Before McKennon, virtually all courts had concluded that, if the plaintiff’s behavior
warranted a discharge, reinstatement and front pay were unsuitable remedies. Disallowing
equitable remedies rests on the argument that the plaintiff has “unclean hands” and therefore
is not entitled to equitable relief. But the Supreme Court has previously rejected this
argument in public policy cases and therefore included the “extraordinary” language in
McKennon. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968),
rev’d, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
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pointless, time-consuming, or abusive discovery.22
C. Beyond McKennon: Recent Commentaries, Guidelines, and Cases
Most commentators suggest that the McKennon court should have favored the
plaintiff even more than it did. Many scholars and judges point out that the defendant
knew about the misconduct only because the plaintiff brought a discrimination suit after
losing her job. They argue that, in some cases, a non-discriminating employer might
never have fired the plaintiff. Consequently, a remedy that focuses on the date of
finding evidence may fail to place the plaintiff where he or she would have been without
the discrimination. After-acquired evidence should influence remedies only if a
defendant would have discovered the information without a lawsuit, according to these
critics.23
Others suggest alternative plaintiff-friendly remedies. One writer contends that front
pay is appropriate in cases like McKennon, where the plaintiff’s misconduct supposedly
would not have occurred but for employer discrimination. Another suggests
reinstatement as a typical remedy because it would send a stronger message to
discriminatory supervisors, who do not typically bear the financial burden of damage
payments but would have to confront a reinstated worker on a daily basis.24
22

This reinforces standards set in Mathis v. Boeing Military Airplane Co., 719 F. Supp.
991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989) and Churchman v. Pinkerton’s Inc., 756 F. Supp. 515, 520 (D. Kan.
1991).
23
For example, see Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co., 31 F. 3d 1221 (3rd Cir. 1994),
and Judge Morris Arnold’s dissent in Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F. 3d 1403
(8th Cir. 1994). See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). At least two
commentators have suggested barring after-acquired evidence unless the employer could
have discovered it in the ordinary course of business. Michelle M. Whitney, Note, The
After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine and its Effect on Recovery in Employment Discrimination
Claims, 31 LAND & W ATER L. REV. 663 (1996); Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence:
Tonic for an Employer’s Cognitive Dissonance, 60 M O. L. REV. 89 (1995). Texas and
Montana courts actually have barred after-acquired evidence in some circumstances. See
Lohmann v. Towers, Perrin, Forster, & Crosby, Inc., No. H-91-3586, 1992 WL 548195 (S.D. Tex.
Oct. 28, 1992); Flanigan v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 720 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1986).
24
Andrea Calvaruso, Two Wrongs Don’t Make A Right: The Supreme Court Strikes
Down the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1321 (1996); Leona Green,
Mixed Motives and After-Acquired Evidence: Second Cousins Benefit from 20/20
Hindsight, 49 A RK. L. REV. 211 (1996). Others who support McKennon or suggest extending
it include Robert J. Gregory, The Use of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment
Discrimination Cases: Should the Guilty Employer Go Free?, 9 LAB . LAW . 43 (1993); Elissa
J. Preheim, Note, Discrimination, Deceit, and Legal Decoys: The Diversion of After-Acquired
Evidence and the Focus Restored by McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Company,
71 IND. L. J. 235 (1995); Lisa R. Petersen, Note, A Final Resolution of the Dispute
Surrounding After-Acquired Evidence as a Defense to Employment Discrimination, 1995
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The EEOC guidelines issued in December 1995 elaborate upon the issue of employer
behavior after a plaintiff has filed a lawsuit.25 Under the guidelines, employers who
seek evidence of past wrongdoing may be guilty of retaliation against the worker.
Accordingly, if employers who are sued for discrimination try to obtain evidence of
previous worker fraud or misconduct, they may face EEOC sanctions as well as
court-imposed penalties for abusive discovery.
A host of after-acquired-evidence cases have arisen since McKennon. In most, the
courts have suggested that plaintiffs are entitled at least to back pay. The following
paragraphs sketch out major post-McKennon developments.
Job misconduct cases thus far primarily have involved misappropriation of
documents or unproductive behavior. In Castle v. Rubin, 26 plaintiff Castle was fired
for poor performance during her probationary period at the U.S. Treasury. She sued,
claiming to be a victim of sex discrimination. Although the defendant later discovered
that Castle had plagiarized extensively instead of writing original training materials, the
court felt bound by McKennon to award back pay. The court did not, however, adopt
the plaintiff’s argument that she was entitled to far more compensation because she
would have been tenured by the time the defendant found the evidence of plagiarism.
In Sigmon v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 27 the New York plaintiff was a female
UTAH L. REV. 943 (1995); Pamela M. Martey, Note, “The Last Temptation is the Greatest
Treason: To Do the Right Deed for the Wrong Reason”: After-Acquired Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Claims: McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 28
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1031 (1995); Carolyn L. Whitford, Note, While the United States Supreme
Court Waves Goodbye to the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, It May Allow the Employer
to Hold a Card Up Its Sleeve in McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 74 NEB. L.
REV. 374 (1995); Tricia Lynne Landthorn, Comment, Two Wrongs Can Make A Right:
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co. and the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine, 56
OHIO ST . L. J. 1019 (1995); Tory E. Griffin, Note, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co.: The Future Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation,
74 OR. L. REV. 781 (1995); Thompson, supra note 5; Martin Adler, Nailing down the Coffin
Lid: the Rise and Fall of the After-acquired Evidence Doctrine in Title VII Litigation, 39
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719 (1994); Sharona Hoffman, The After-Acquired Evidence Rule: The Best
of All Possible Worlds? 22 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 79 (1996); Sheldon J. Stark & Margaret J.
Sande, Here’s the Dirt on ‘After-Acquired’ Evidence Since McKennon, TRIAL, Sept. 1997, at
28.
25
EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (December 14, 1995), in UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EMPLOYER EEO RESPONSIBILITIES : PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION IN
THE W ORKPLACE, THE LAW AND EEOC PROCEDURES (Technical Assistance Program, Apr.
1996).
26
27

78 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
901 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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lawyer fired after returning from maternity leave. She claimed sex discrimination and
poor treatment by her colleagues; the defendants pointed out the radical decrease in
hours billed by Sigmon and legitimate needs for reductions in force. During discovery,
the defendants found that Sigmon had taken and copied several confidential documents
located in the room allotted to her for her job search. In the Iowa dispute of Walters v.
U.S. Gypsum, 28 a forklift operator was fired, allegedly for poor performance,
absenteeism, and abuse of coworkers. She claimed disability discrimination. The
defendant later found that Walters frequently had come to work under the influence of
beer or marijuana.
Cases of résumé fraud after McKennon have yielded false reports of college degrees
or work experience, obscuring of criminal records, failure to report firings from
previous jobs, and misleading health information. For example, in Petrovich v. LPI
Service Corp., 29 the plaintiff claimed that his employer fired him because he was
Serbian, not because he couldn’t do his job. The defendant later found that Petrovich
had omitted references to previous jobs and falsified his credentials and experience.
Petrovich then claimed that someone else had prepared his résumé so he should not be
held responsible for errors within it. Although the court did not adopt Petrovich’s
argument -- apparently because the man had had time to read his prepared résumé -- it
left the door open for remedies in addition to back pay. In the Fifth Circuit case of
Patterson v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 30 the plaintiff allegedly was fired for
insubordination, tardiness, and inability to work constructively with others. He filed a
race discrimination charge against his employer, who subsequently discovered that
Brown had been earlier convicted of burglary (although his record was later expunged).
A Michigan plaintiff in Wright v. Restaurant Concept Management, Inc. 31 also claimed
race discrimination after he was fired for insubordination from his position as a
restaurant manager. The defendant later found that Wright had earlier been convicted
for felonious assault after engaging in a six-hour standoff with police. In the Kentucky
dispute of Toyota Mfg. Co. U.S.A., Inc. v. Epperson, 32 the Toyota company discharged
a probationary employee under established company policy when he did not return from
disability leave after six months. He claimed disability discrimination. Toyota then
discovered that Epperson had neglected to disclose his termination from previous jobs
and his substantial medical problems. Although the court awarded damages, one judge
wrote a furious dissent, arguing that damages in this case constituted a reward for
gross fraud.
One interesting issue that has arisen is this: should the McKennon standard apply in
ordinary breach-of-contract cases as well as in discrimination cases? Some courts
28
29
30
31
32

537 N.W. 2d 708 (Iowa 1995).
949 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996).
532 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
945 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1996).
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seem inclined to say “yes.”33 A few have said “no”. For example, in Crawford
Rehabilitation Services v. Weissman, 34 the plaintiff protested her termination after she
took an unauthorized day off. In fact, her employer had explicitly denied permission for
the holiday. Her employer later discovered that Weissman had failed to report a
previous termination for cause and had lied about her job experience. The court
decided that McKennon did not entitle this plaintiff to any damages. In the South
Carolina case of Lewis v. Fisher Service Co., 35 the plaintiff was fired when he made
secret tape recordings of conversations with his supervisor, then replayed them for
co-workers. He protested, saying that the company handbook provided for progressive
discipline except in cases of very serious offenses. The defendant later found that
Lewis had engaged in similar tape-recordings in previous jobs. The court suggested
that the after-acquired evidence, coupled with the “serious-offense” clause in the
handbook, should permit the employer to avoid all liability.
II. AN ECONOMIC VIEW OF AFTER-ACQUIRED-EVIDENCE CASES
A. Economic Models of Statistical Discrimination and Signaling
Most economists are reluctant to use pure discrimination as the leading explanation
for differences in job-market experiences between blacks and whites, women and men,
and the like. Pure discrimination -- the unequal treatment by employers of equally
productive people -- is costly. Gary Becker’s seminal work demonstrates that, in a
competitive market, discriminating employers would lose money and go out of
business.36
Yet job-market differences persist, so economists have turned to alternative
explanations to account for them. Edmund Phelps, Dennis Aigner, and Glen Cain
pioneered the notion of using statistical discrimination as a way to explain wage
differentials.37 Their models presume that employers can observe the quality of job
33

S. Med. Health Sys., Inc. v. Vaughn, 669 So. 2d 98 (Ala. 1995); see also Gassman v.
Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, Inc., 921 P.2d 224 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996), aff’d, 933
P.2d 743 (Kan. 1997).
34
35

938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997).
495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998).

36

GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2nd ed. 1971); see also STUDIES IN
LABOR M ARKETS (Sherwin Rosen ed. 1981); IMPLICIT CONTRACT THEORY (Sherwin Rosen ed.
1994); ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (Emily P. Hoffman ed. 1991). But see
Francine D. Blau & Marianne A. Ferber, Discrimination: Empirical Evidence from the
United States, 77 A M. ECON. REV. 316 (1987). Blau and Ferber offer data showing that blacks
and women are paid lower wages and encounter higher unemployment than otherwise
comparable white males. Id. at 319.
37
Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 A M. ECON. REV.
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applicants via some testing mechanism. Test scores yield only imperfect information
about quality, however, so employers may base wage offers on other observable
information such as skin color or sex. If employers are risk-averse and test scores are
less reliable for, say, blacks and women, then white males may receive better offers.38
This effect is exacerbated if employers believe that blacks and women are less
productive on average, perhaps because of pre-labor-market discrimination in schooling
or housing.
In these sorts of models, employers have incentives to design superior tests in order
to increase profits. An employer who develops a better test could hire blacks and
females at a wage higher than they could make elsewhere, but lower than the
white-male wage. At the same time, blacks and women have incentives to acquire
qualifications like better education or good references that send signals to employers.
These signals permit employers to get past imperfect test results, skin color, and sex.39
Clear signals of individual productivity lessen employer reliance on flawed testing
mechanisms and group characteristics.
More recent statistical-discrimination models have focused on differences in labor
market experience other than wages.40 Bradford Cornell and Ivo Welch, for example,

659 (1972); Dennis J. Aigner & Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor
Markets, 30 INDUS . & LAB . REL. REV. 175 (1977). See also Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job
Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83 (Anthony H. Pascal ed.,
1972); Melvin Reder, Human Capital and Economic Discrimination, in HUMAN RESOURCES
AND ECONOMIC W ELFARE 71 (Ivar Berg ed., 1972); Glen G. Cain, The Economic Analysis of
Labor Market Discrimination: A Survey, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 693 (Orley
Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986); Rein Haagsma, Statistical Discrimination and
Competitive Signalling, 36 ECON. LETTERS 93 (1991); Gerald S. Oettinger, Statistical
Discrimination and the Early Career Evolution of the Black -White Wage Gap, 14 J. LAB .
ECON. 52 (1996). The Spring 1998 issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives also contains
a thoughtful set of papers. See Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era:
Beyond Market Interactions, 12 J. ECON. PERSPS. 117 (1998).
38
In these models, this is true at least for candidates with test scores above a certain
level.
39

See A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973) (the classic
work on signaling in the labor market); see also A. MICHAEL SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING
(1974); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Screening, Education, and the Distribution of
Income, 65 A M. ECON. REV. 283 (1975).
40

For example, workers might encounter different hiring, promotion, or unemployment
patterns. Explanations for such differences may lie in different underlying quit rates. See
Michael Sattinger, Statistical Discrimination with Employment Criteria, 39 INT’L ECON. REV.
205 (1998). Differences may also lie in residence. See Steven Raphael, 51 INDUS . LAB . REL.
REV. 505 (1998). Differences in job-market treatment may also result in disparate job-market
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set up a model in which employers post fixed wages, then hire from a pool of
applicants based on inferred ability.41 Here, employers screen applicants based on a
variety of signals received. If employers can more easily evaluate an applicant who
resembles them -- in skin color, sex, religious beliefs, ethnicity, and so forth -interviewing such a person gives employers more information than interviewing a
person of a different race, sex, or background. “Same-group” candidates therefore
have a better chance of landing a job.
The Cornell-Welch model, like the wage models, generates incentives for employers
to devise lower-cost ways of learning about “other-group” candidates. Moreover, as in
wage models, “other-group” candidates have motives to acquire signals that convey
information cheaply to prospective employers. Significantly, the Cornell-Welch model
also implies that, fi employers could choose to evaluate workers on the job (via
assessments that cost the same for each worker) rather than screen beforehand,
screening discrimination could disappear. But if a law were passed that made firing
employees - particularly those in the “other group” - more expensive, employers would
have to rely more on ex ante interviews than ex post evaluations of job performance.
Passing such a law would therefore tend to increase employer rejection of
“other-group” applicants.
A plausible extension of the Cornell-Welch model could add the assumption that
on-the-job evaluations cost more for “other-group” employees. If so, employers would
tend to screen out “other-group” applicants and fire “other-group” employees at a
relatively higher rate -- not out of prejudice, but rather as a response to greater costs of
assessment. Once again, “other-group” individuals would have incentives to invest in
signals to overcome the information problem. Again, as well, a law that increased the
price of firing employees would also increase the incidence of screening out
“other-group” job candidates.

2. The Typical After-Acquired Evidence Scenario: The Plaintiff Sent a False
Labor-Market Signal
Signaling models offer a useful way to view after-acquired-evidence cases. In
such cases, after-acquired evidence indicates that a plaintiff misrepresented or
concealed information from an employer. The employer used the tainted
information supplied by the plaintiff as a signal to indicate the suitability of including
participation. For empirical measurement, see Marjorie Baldwin & William G. Johnson,
Estimating the Employment Effects of Wage Discrimination, 74 REV. ECON. STAT . 446 (1992).
41

Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination,
104 J. POL. ECON. 542 (1996).
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the person in a pool of prospective employees, matching the person with the job,
or keeping the person employed. Like the wolf in sheep’s clothing, the plaintiff is
not what he or she appeared.
In some after-acquired-evidence cases, the plaintiff inflated the amount of
human capital acquired, falsely claiming to have graduated from college (obtained a
sheepskin, in other words) or gained previous on-the-job experience. Because
investment in human capital yields an expected increase in job productivity, clear
evidence of such investment -- like a baccalaureate degree or list of satisfied
former employers -- cheaply communicates to a potential employer the ability to
do a good job.42 Of course, these attributes also tend to raise wages. Faking a
degree or work experience, therefore, means sending a signal that the job applicant
is more productive, and thus worth more, than he or she really is.
In other cases, the plaintiff concealed a defect in human capital by not
reporting criminal convictions or terminations from previous jobs for fraud. In
these instances, the plaintiff deliberately obscured a signal that might have revealed
his or her relative incompatibility with the job.43
In a third set of cases, the employee committed an initially undiscovered act in
the course of his or her current employment. For instance, the worker may have
falsified records or filched confidential files. Such an act would signal the
42

For discussions of theory and empirical evidence on human capital and productivity,
see GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3rd. ed. 1993). See also JACOB M INCER, SCHOOLING,
EXPERIENCE, AND EARNINGS (1964); Dale T. Mortensen, Specific Capital and Labor Turnover,
9 BELL J. ECON. 572 (1978); Boyan Jovanovic, Firm-Specific Capital and Turnover, 87 J. POL.
ECON. 1246 (1979); John Pencavel, Higher Education, Productivity, and Earnings, 22 J. ECON.
EDUC . 331 (1991); W. Norton Grubb, The Varied Economic Returns to Post-Secondary
Education: New Evidence from the Class of 1972, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES 365 (1993); T. Paul
Schultz, Investments in the Schooling and Health of Women and Men: Quantities and
Returns, 28 J. HUM. RESOURCES 694 (1993); Tracy R. Lewis & David E. M. Sappington,
Choosing Workers’ Qualifications: No Experience Necessary?, 34 INT ’L. ECON. REV. 479
(1993); Marc Fox, Is it a Good Investment to Attend an Elite Private College?, 12 ECON.
EDUC . REV. 137 (1993); Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Inequality and Relative Wages, 83
A M. ECON. REV. 104 (1993); Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Occupational Change and the
Demand for Skill, 1940-1990, 83 A M. ECON. REV. 122 (1993); see generally JACOB M INCER,
THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF JACOB M INCER (1993).
43
This is not to say that all criminals are unsuitable for all jobs. But people previously
convicted for embezzlement may not be appropriate bank employees, and people jailed for
assault might not be seemly hotel concierges.
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employee’s dishonesty and unproductive attributes - if the employer only knew of
it.44
III. DISSECTING MCKENNON: ITS STATED PURPOSE AND ITS UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES
Discrimination statutes cover classes of qualified persons who possess some
inborn trait: sex, race, age, and so forth. Such laws aim to ensure that workers
similarly situated with respect to productive characteristics will not encounter
discrimination on the basis of immutable features irrelevant to job performance.
Whether they achieve these aims is a matter of controversy - some scholars
contend that discrimination laws actually are counterproductive or enforced so
inappropriately that they do more harm than good.45 In part, these contentions
arise because economic forces should typically make pure discrimination an
unprofitable endeavor.
However, suppose some pure discrimination exists in labor markets, perhaps
because of market imperfections or because prejudiced supervisors depart from
their employers’ profit-making objectives. The rules laid out in McKennon are
designed to reinforce discrimination statutes by punishing employers who act in a
discriminatory fashion -- a laudable goal. Yet McKennon may also generate
serious consequences that the Supreme Court did not contemplate. By doing
violence to the labor-market signaling process, McKennon may ultimately harm the
very people the Court intended to help.
44

Inappropriate behavior on the job is not the sort of signal that Spence discussed.
Nevertheless, the logic of signaling easily ext ends to this situation.
45

See James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment
Discrimination Laws: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 276 (1990); RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS : THE CASE A GAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
(1992); Thomas G. Abram, The Law, Its Interpretation, Levels of Enforcement Activity, and
Effect on Employer Behavior, 83 A M. ECON. REV. 62 (1993); Mark R. Killingsworth, Analyzing
Employment Discrimination: From the Seminar Room to the Courtroom, 83 A M. ECON. REV.
67 (1993); Robert S. Follett, et al., Problems in Assessing Employment Discrimination, 83 AM.
ECON. REV. 73 (1993); James P. Smith, Affirmative Action and the Racial Wage Gap, 83 A M.
ECON. REV. 79 (1993); Stephen Coate & Glenn Loury, Antidiscrimination Enforcement and the
Problem of Patronization, 83 A M. ECON. REV. 92 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, The Subtle Vices
of the Employment Discrimination Laws, 29 J. M ARSHALL L. REV. 575 (1996).
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A. Discrimination Statutes, the Apparent Dilemma of a Summary Judgment
Rule, and Administrative Costs
Before McKennon, courts that ordered summary judgment for employer
defendants typically relied on the argument that plaintiffs in after-acquired-evidence
cases had no legal standing. The argument went like this: Under discrimination
statutes, someone with an enumerated trait is protected only insofar as he or she is
a qualified person. If workers gain or keep jobs under false pretenses, they are not
qualified persons because they are not similarly situated with respect to productive
characteristics. A worker who falsely claims to have a master’s degree in
engineering, for example, does not truly resemble a person who has the degree.
The educational capital of the two differs and so may the trustworthiness. Although
the worker may have an immutable trait listed in discrimination statutes, he or she is
not a member of the protected class and therefore cannot be a victim of
discrimination under the statutes.
Whereas this argument is logical and legally supportable, it seems to pose a
dilemma: we do not want to reward undeserving plaintiffs, yet nor do we wish to
encourage discriminatory behavior by employers. As one court put it: “[a ]false
statement on an employment application is not be an insurance policy covering
bigotry.”46 Suppose an employer fired someone with an immutable trait, unaware
that the worker was actually an impostor. Although after-acquired evidence
reinforces the defendant’s action, the timing of the knowledge cannot rule out a
discriminatory motive. To critics of summary judgment, the rule therefore
worsened labor market conditions for those whom discrimination statutes sought to
protect. Summary judgment cut off any plaintiff who had suffered discriminatory
treatment, thus generating a type I error.47
To be sure, a departure from summary judgment costs more to administer.
Under McKennon, for example, employers will face more lawsuits and settle more
cases with plaintiffs. Not only will plaintiffs file more lawsuits, per-case
46

Bazzi v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 808 F. Supp. 1306, 1310 (E.D. Mich. 1992), rev’d, 25
F.3d. 1047 (6th Cir. 1994).
47

A type I error occurs when someone rejects a hypothesis as false when it is actually

true.
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administrative costs may escalate because McKennon leaves many questions for
individual courts to resolve.48 Further, because plaintiffs can potentially recover
damages up to the time of discovery of incriminating evidence, they have clear
financial incentives to protract the discovery process. However, to opponents of
summary judgment, this increased administrative burden simply reflects the cost our
society should be willing to pay to deter pure discrimination by employers.
2. Potential Failures of McKennon: Higher Social Costs, More Discrimination,
and Lower Investment by Minorities in Productive Capital
Regrettably, added administrative costs are probably not the only outcome of
McKennon. The McKennon rule potentially creates significant other social costs
as well. It obscures the value of signals, causing employers to spend more on
pre-employment screening and post-hire job evaluations. Worst of all, it may
actually increase the incidence of statistical discrimination, divert attention from
purely prejudicial employer behavior, and discourage minorities from investing in
human capital.
1. Fuzzy signals and the costs of McKennon to employers
McKennon essentially reduces the costs to individuals of sending false signals in
the labor market. At the same time, it augments costs to employers of evaluating
job applicants and existing employees.
Suppose an individual falsely claims to have a college degree. An employer
who discovers the lie in the hiring process is economically justified in rejecting the
applicant - because the person may not possess the human capital necessary to
perform the job and may not be trustworthy. If an employer learns of the lie after
the applicant is hired but must still pay damages under McKennon, the penalties to
applicants of sending a false signal are lower than under a summary judgment rule.
Consequently, McKennon erodes the value of the educational signal itself.
Cumbersome screening methods (and possibly poorer initial matches) will replace
the substantial benefits of having an easily conveyed and trustworthy signal.49
48

One commentator has called for an even greater administrative role for courts in
after-acquired-evidence cases than McKennon suggests, requesting that they use a
comparative fault standard to arrive at damages. Petersen, supra note 24.
49
For discussions of the benefits of good matches, see Robert E. Hall, Turnover in the
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Certainly, one might argue that employers could help themselves in these cases
simply by calling all schools and previous employers, or requiring the submission of
transcripts or performance evaluations. However, such measures take time and
money, and documents are easily faked. Perhaps more important, self-reported
qualifications typically have served as an essential device for an employer to obtain
a pool of eligible employees. Yet employers simply cannot afford to rely on
self-reporting under McKennon as much as they could under a summary judgment
rule.
Now suppose a defect in human capital goes unreported because the plaintiff
neglects to report previous assault convictions on his or her job application. The
person is hired, then fired, allegedly for unruly behavior. An employer might initially
overrate the worker’s potential productivity on the job. An employer-defendant
could also suffer substantial additional economic loss if the plaintiff convinces a
court of employer discrimination despite having concealed a shady past. Under
McKennon, the employer must design more costly mechanisms to check the fit
between job and worker because the ruling makes a self-reported “clean-living”
signal less reliable.50
People send signals on the job that indicate their suitability, just as they do when
applying for employment. Indicators of a poor match, such as an employee’s
falsification of records, are even stronger if they are artfully concealed. Under
McKennon, the value of apparent-good-behavior signals is smaller, productivity is
relatively lower, and matches of workers to jobs are inferior. Employers have
incentives to increase surveillance of all employees. At some point, workplace
Labor Force, 1972 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 709, and Boyan Jovanovic, Job
Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972 (1979). In more recent work,
researchers have shown that government regulation of job creation and destruction impairs
job-worker matching, leading to decreased average productivity and substantial welfare loss.
Hugo Hopenhayn & Richard Rogerson, Job Turnover and Policy Evaluation: A General
Equilibrium Analysis, 101 J. POL. ECON. 915 (1993).
50
The case of Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 35 Cal. 4th 620 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995), for example, barred any relief for plaintiffs who never would have been hired. Here, the
plaintiffs worked as legal secretaries. On their job applications, they reported that they had
never committed any felony. In truth, they previously had been convicted of conspiring to
defraud a bank. McKennon opens the door for plaintiffs in cases like these to obtain some
damages.
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privacy issues could well conflict with employers’ need to guard against deceitful
employees.
2. Fuzzy signals and the costs of McKennon to members of target groups.
Employers generally face greater costs under McKennon than under a summary
judgment rule, but why may members of target groups suffer? In part, because
everyone pays when signals lose clarity. More to the point, fuzzy signals imply that
employers may have to resort to supplemental group data on highly visible traits as
they make hiring and other employment decisions. By comparison to a summary
judgment rule, the McKennon rule diminishes the value of signals. This elevates the
costs of acquiring information about prospective employees -- particularly those in
the “other group ” -- and raises employers’ reliance (whether prejudicially
motivated or not) on information associated with easily observable, immutable
characteristics. As the Cornell-Welch model makes clear, a law that increases the
price of firing employees -- especially those in the “other group” -- may mean that
employers simply screen out “other-group” candidates. By attempting to eliminate
true discrimination, the McKennon decision thus makes statistical discrimination
more likely. In fact, members of target groups may never even have a chance to
be plaintiffs. Employers could simply choose to locate in places where few
individuals with protected traits reside in order to fend off discrimination-in-hiring
charges.51
When “other-group” candidates are hired, McKennon is far likelier to generate
type II errors -- rewarding false claims -- than to reduce type I errors.52 Why?
McKennon came before the Court on the express assumption that discrimination
was the sole basis for termination. But this overlooks something critical. The
McKennon court stated that “[t]he employer could not have been motivated by

51

For discussion, see Abram, supra note 45, at 62; Coate & Loury, supra note 45, at 92.
For many reasons, the United States already has a spatial mismatch between jobs and
potential workers. See Stephen L. Ross, Racial Differences in Residential and Job Mobility:
Evidence Concerning the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis, 43 J. URB. ECON. 112 (1998); Wayne
Vroman, Industrial Change and Black Men’s Relative Earnings, in 12 RESEARCH IN LABOR
ECONOMICS (Ronald G. Ehrenberg ed. 1991).
52
A type II error occurs when someone accepts a hypothesis as true even though it is
actually false.
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knowledge it did not have.”53 True, but the after-acquired evidence obtained in
many cases gave considerable weight to the employer’s original rationale for firing
(or not hiring) the plaintiff. Plaintiffs who falsely claimed to have college degrees or
relevant work experience frequently were dismissed for poor performance,
according to defendants.54 The defendants’ claims seem plausible if the level of
education and the presence of previous jobs are positively correlated with
subsequent work performance. Other plaintiffs who were discharged for poor
performance had in fact stolen money or confidential materials from employers,
cheated employers, came to work impaired, or lied about their physical health. 55
Again, the defendant’s feelings about the quality of the plaintiff’s contributions to
53

McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995). One issue in
after-acquired-evidence cases is their resemblance to mixed-motive cases. If a worker is fired
for two reasons -- one discriminatory and one not -- the employer can avoid liability if he
would have taken the same action absent the discriminatory reason. The problem with
applying the mixed-motive reasoning directly to after-acquired-evidence cases is that the
employer did not have the damning evidence at the time of making the employment decision -he obtained it only during discovery. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 US 274 (1977), 670 F.2d 59 (6th Cir 1982); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 US 228
(1989), aff’d, 920 F.2d 967 (1990); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Insurance Co., 31 F. 3d 1221 (3rd
Cir. 1994); Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed
Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1991); Heather K.
Gerken, Note, Understanding Mixed Motive Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991: An
Analysis of International Claims Based on Sex-Stereotyped Interview Questions, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1824 (1993).
54

See Johnson v. Honeywell Info. Sys., Inc., 955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992); Bonger v.
Am. Water Works, 789 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1992); Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31
F.3d 1221 (3rd Cir. 1994); Cooper v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 972;
Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d 117 (10th Cir. 1995); Petrovich v. LPI Serv. Corp., 949 F.
Supp. 626 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Barlow v. Hester Indus. Inc., 479 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1996).
55

See Summers v. State Farm, 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir 1988); Paglio v. Chagrin Valley
Hunt Club Corp., No. 91-3983, 1992 WL144674 (6th Cir 1992); O’Day v. McDonnell Douglas
Helicopter Co., 784 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Ariz. 1992), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 79 F.3d 756 (9th
Cir.1996); Dotson v. U.S. Postal Service, 961 F.2d 1576 (6th Cir. 1992); Greene v. Standard
Register Co. 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1151 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Walters v. U.S. Gypsum,
537 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1995); Sigmon v. Parker, Chapin, Flattau & Klimpl, 901 F. Supp. 667
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), Toyota v. Epperson, 945 S.W.2d 413 (Ky. 1996); Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106
F.3d 457 (2d Cir. (N.Y. 1996); Gassman v. Evangelical Luth. Good Sam. Soc., 921 P.2d 224
(Colo. 1996). A related case is Carlson v. WPLGTV-IO, Post-Newsweek Stations, 956 F. Supp.
994 (S.D. Fla. 1996). See also Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure-to-hire
case).
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the job related believably to actual quality. Still other plaintiffs who were fired for
insubordination, marginal job performance, or unpalatable behavior had actually
committed reprehensible acts in the past.56 If those who misbehaved in the past
are more likely to misbehave in the future, the claims of employer-defendants seem
to have merit. In sum, although pure discrimination may have transpired in some
after-acquired-evidence cases, the facts frequently indicate otherwise.
Consequently, McKennon may well spawn disputes that draw attention away
from pure discrimination in the workplace. By de-emphasizing the plaintiff’s status,
McKennon means that members of protected classes will find their educational
degrees demeaned, their clean criminal records less noteworthy, and their
exemplary work performance less valuable. Those who expected to stand proudly
by their accomplishments -- and use these to buttress claims of unfair or prejudicial
treatment -- are lumped together with everyone of the same race, sex, religion, or
other common trait. Put simply, those who truly encounter discrimination on the
job may get lost in the shuffle. Let me explain: the more we can isolate an
immutable trait as the only difference between a plaintiff and other workers, the
more we might point to pure discrimination on the part of the employer or the
employer’s representatives. McKennon muddies the process. Of course, honest
plaintiffs who suffer pure discrimination theoretically would obtain greater damages
than McKennon-type plaintiffs because they would be more likely to qualify for
front pay and reinstatement. But the reality is that resources are scarce and life is
uncertain: under McKennon, honest people may find it as difficult to distinguish
themselves in a courtroom as they do in a job interview. This is especially true
because discovery that would flush out a dishonest plaintiff is costly under
McKennon and the EEOC guidelines: the sanctions on employers for abusive
discovery may over-deter them from engaging in any meaningful discovery. One
plausible result is an increase in the number of settlements, with settlement amounts
56

See Sweeney v. U-Haul Co., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Wallace
v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992); Milligan-Jensen v. Mich. Tech.
Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 509 U.S. 903 (1992), cert. dismissed, 509 U.S.
943 (1993); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F. 2d 250 (7th Cir. 1992); Wright v. Restaurant,
532 N.W.2d 889 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Patterson v. PHP Healthcare, 90 F. 3d.927 (5th Cir.
1996); Crawford Rehab. Serv. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997); Lewis v. Fisher Service
Co., 495 S.E.2d 440 (S.C. 1998); Mathis v. Boeing, 719 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D. Kan. 1989); see
also Kravit v. Delta Air Lines, 60 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (failure to
hire).
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failing to distinguish between honest and dishonest plaintiffs and failing to separate
prejudiced from unprejudiced defendants.
What might be the ultimate consequence of McKennon? Besides an increased
incidence of pre-hire screening by employers, McKennon creates disincentives to
invest in signals, particularly for those with protected traits. Because McKennon
reduces the informational content of signals, people with traits enumerated in
discrimination statutes simply may not find it as worthwhile to acquire costly human
capital or other sorts of indicators of productivity. To the extent members of
protected classes -- particularly minorities -- historically have invested less in
education, training, and other forms of human capital, a legal rule that grants relief
to dishonest plaintiffs may well widen the skills gap.57
Not incidentally, the strain on court resources imposed by McKennon -particularly if courts extend the McKennon reasoning to simple breach-of-contract
cases -- aggravates an already troubling trend. Civil rights litigation has expanded
far more rapidly over the last three decades than other forms of litigation because
legislatures have added types of protected classes, the EEOC has expanded its
jurisdiction, and judges have accepted new theories of liability. As some worried
commentators point out, these expansions mean that people focus far less on the
original target group -- African-Americans. At the same time, the gains of this
group have slowed considerably. 58
IV. CONCLUSION
College degrees, relevant previous experience, spotless criminal records, and
evidence of good work performance all send signals to employers that prospective
and chosen employees will fit their jobs well. These labor market signals thus
perform an economic function by saving on information costs. Integrity of such
signals means good matches between workers and jobs, low turnover, high returns
to investments in human capital, and a productive economy. These in turn yield
57

Younger well-educated blacks of both sexes and black female college graduates earned
a lower premium for education even before McKennon. David Card & Thomas Lemieux, Wage
Dispersion, Returns to Skill, and Black-White Wage Differentials, 74 J. ECONOMETRICS 319,
321 (1996); see also June O’Neill, The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences
Between Black and White Men, 4 J. ECON. PERSPS. 25 (1990).
58
See Abram, supra note 45, at 62; Smith, supra note 45, at 79.
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lower costs of doing business, which benefits workers and consumers as well as
employers. Sound signals also reduce employers’ use of immutable characteristics
as indicators of productivity, thus decreasing the likelihood of statistical
discrimination. In a world of clear signals, courts could therefore focus on ferreting
out cases of true workplace prejudice.
The McKennon court intended to discourage discriminatory behavior by
employers. Yet, by providing redress to plaintiffs with no real legal standing, it also
reduced the usefulness of job market signals. One of the most disturbing aspects
of the ruling is that members of protected classes will potentially suffer. Increases
in pre-hire screening may make finding jobs harder for minorities. Those who are
hired may find that proving subtle cases of prejudice has become more difficult.
An individual with a protected trait could point to legitimate qualifications and good
job performance to support a claim of employer discrimination if signals were
reliable; not so when signals lose their shine. As a result, people with protected
traits may have less incentive to invest in human capital and to act productively on
the job. This in turn could exacerbate existing discrepancies in marketable skills
across different groups in the population.
The fallout from McKennon is still in progress. Because of the remedial leeway
left by the McKennon court, the effect on the signaling process is as yet impossible
to ascertain empirically. Many law review articles have called for applications of
McKennon that will enhance plaintiff awards, whereas trial courts generally have
squelched equitable relief in cases of severe misconduct.57 The net impact of
McKennon will clearly turn upon the way courts tend to apply the ruling.
One last point: the economic boom enjoyed in the U.S. since the McKennon
ruling has probably meant that at least some rejected job applicants and fired
workers have gotten new jobs and gone on with their lives rather than filed lawsuits
claiming discrimination. Watching what happens when the economy turns
downward will likely enlighten us as to the true implications of McKennon.
1.

57

See Stark & Sande, supra note 24, at 30.
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